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Chapter 4
The Rise of the Natural-Rate of Unemployment Model
4.1 Introduction
With respect to political mythology, the Northern spring of 1968 is chiefly remembered
(like its forerunner of 1848) as a 'springtime' of youthful and hirsute left-revolutionary
fervour. This revolutionary wave could plausibly include a US President amongst its
victims, broken by the weight of office.i In contrast to all this tragedy and melodrama,
with respect to influence over economic policy and all that flows from that, the most
revolutionary call to arms of that time, was Milton Friedman's American Economic
Association (AEA) Presidential Address. Neither youthful nor hirsute, he was an
advocate of floating exchange rates, monetary targeting, low if not zero inflation, the
abandonment of fine tuning, lower taxes and less regulated markets.
Within a decade or so all this became part of the fabric of economic policy, at least at
the level of the rhetoric of commitment. By 1970, all countries seemed to be "'off the
[Phillips] curve' in the same direction" (Solow 1970, 95, 103); in 1971, the Bretton
Woods system was effectively scuttled; from the mid-1970s Phillips curve targeting was
replaced by monetary targeting; fine tuning was abandoned. Markets were increasingly
deregulated, and no political party, it seemed, could win power unless committed to a
reduction in taxes. Everywhere, it seemed, reducing inflation took priority over
reducing unemployment, and the British Prime Minister announced the death of the
Keynesian order to the 1976 Labour Party conference. In Tony Crosland's words 'the
party is over', and The Fiscal Crisis of the State had arrived (O'Connor 1973; Stigler
1988a, 10). The 'left wave' surged and broke, leaving the Democratic Party and the
British Labour Party out of office for much of the following two decades.ii
There are many interesting aspects of this policy revolution; some relating to the process
of knowledge destruction (McIvor 1983). Milton Friedman formulated the Natural-Rate
Expectations Augmented Phillips curve (the N-REAP model) at least as early as 1960,
but his first written exposition came only in April 1966 (Leeson 1997c). In the
intervening period, Barry Goldwater (who had been advised by Friedman) had been
defeated in the 1964 Presidential election; policy advice of the Keynesian variety was
sought from Cambridge, Massachusetts; the times appeared to be unconducive to the
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Chicago cause. Friedman was clearly influenced by Goldwater's defeat. During his
tenure as AEA President, Friedman (1967a, 87-8) reflected that "The fact - or what I
allege to be a fact - that differences about policy reflect mostly differences in predictions
is concealed by the widespread tendency to attribute policy differences to differences in
value judgements ... I was particularly impressed by the seductiveness of this approach
during the 1964 Presidential election campaign, when most of the intellectuals, of all
people, largely cut off the possibility of rational discussion by refusing to recognise the
possibility that Senator Goldwater might have much the same objectives as they and
simply differ in his judgement about how to achieve them".
There are several other interesting aspects of this revolution. In A Tract on Monetary
Reform, Keynes (JMK IV [1923], 27) argued that rises in money wages would be
unstable if caused by "some temporary and exhaustible influence connected with
inflation". It was also a common-place of the somewhat marginalised economists of the
Mont Pelerin Society that "There is no need today to dwell on the problem of the
falsification of economic calculation under inflationary conditions" (von Mises 1974
[1951], 127). But von Mises (1974 [1958], 154, 159) specifically spelt out that
"Inflation can cure unemployment only by curtailing the wage earner's real wages"
[emphasis in text]; unemployment increased as inflationary expectations were revealed
to be lower than actual inflation. An almost identical analysis of the way incorrect
inflationary expectations can temporarily reduce unemployment can be found in the
work of Hayek (1958; 1972 [1960], 65-97) and Haberler (1958, 140). William Fellner
(1959, 227, 235-6) and Raymond J. Saulnier (1963, 25-27), both highly influential
economists, also worked out versions of the N-REAP model at this time.
These critiques made little impression at the time, and unlike Friedman's AEA address,
are rarely remembered. Alvin Hansen (1964, 342-3, 288), the 'American Keynes',
discussed and dismissed "misguided expectations", preferring instead the "objective
causes of the cycle". Paul Samuelson, Hansen's successor in the American Keynesian
hierarchy, pondered before a blackboard in academic year 1964-5, and dismissed these
early N-REAP models as being of doubtful validity (Akerlof 1982, 337). In December
1965, Samuelson acknowledged that targeting a point on a Phillips curve could shift the
curve itself: "One ought to admit that the overausterity of the Eisenhower
Administration may have done something to give America a better Phillips curve" (cited
by Haberler 1966, 130). This chapter presents evidence which suggests that there were
several economists who made statements which cannot be reconciled with the original
Phillips curve trade-off. Inflation was clearly increasing; some economists also argued
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that unemployment was likely to increase. This implies stagflation; but before
Friedman's AEA speech, this made little impression on professional opinion. This
chapter, in part, therefore, analyses the pre-history of the belief that ongoing inflation
would be accompanied by increasing rates of unemployment.
The conventional view of this episode is that Friedman patiently accumulated evidence
relating money and prices, and (if we ignore Phelps) used this understanding to uniquely
predict stagflation. This predictive success enhanced the reputation of both the quantity
theory of money and Friedman's methodology of positive economics; it also elevated the
N-REAP model to centre stage. Friedman (1968a, 8) constructed his N-REAP model in
Walrasian terms, despite being a Marshallian sceptic about the practical significance of
Walrasian economics. Using this Walrasian language, Friedman made a prediction
(about stagflation) which would evict Keynesians from their position of policy influence
(section 4.2). It was not a prediction that was unique to him, although his prediction was
the most comprehensive. Section 4.3 describes the inflationary momentum of the 1960s
(the prelude to the Natural-Rate revolution). The trade-off interpretation of the Phillips
curve stated that this should be accompanied by a reduction in rates of unemployment.
Section 4.4, in contrast, highlights the writings of those economists (mostly labour
economists) who diagnosed that unemployment would increase during this period.
Concluding remarks are provided in section 4.5.
4.2 Predictive Success
The N-REAP model (the vehicle for Friedman's challenge) is an equilibrating story
which can be described, in inflation-unemployment space, using the analogy of a $ (or
an 'S' spiked by a vertical Natural-Rate of unemployment). The macrosystem is
constrained to move along this 'S' shaped trajectory. Along the top half of the 'S', a
Keynesian fall in the price of money can only be temporary - an inflationary boom can
only dissipate itself, as Keynesian money turns 'dishonest'. Along the bottom half of the
'S', a monetarist rise in the price of money will dissipate itself by inducing selfdestructing delusions about inflationary expectations (the short-run Phillips curve will
shift inwards as unemployment increases). Monetarist money becomes 'honest', as the
rate of inflation is forced down by the reduced rate of growth of the money supply.
Monetary discipline, tied to accommodating wage behaviour, can be relied upon to
produce permanent reductions in both inflation and unemployment.
Predictive success along the top half of the 'S' (representing macroeconomic 'bads') was
regarded as sufficient evidence to formulate disinflationary policies on the expectation
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that the system could be moved along the bottom half of the 'S' (a temporary
macroeconomic 'bad' plus a 'good', followed by two macroeconomic 'goods'). Friedman
is one of the most brilliant economists of all time; but some of his predictions have been
falsified. At the start of the Monetarist decade, Friedman (1974a, 12) predicted that
"The world crude oil price cannot stay at $10 a barrel; it will drop dramatically within
the next six or nine months ...". He also stated (1968a, 9) that the Natural-Rate of
unemployment was held high by the strength of labour unions; but as trade union power
waned during the 1980s, estimates of the Natural-Rate increased. And disinflation, at
least in the UK, was far more costly than imagined (Laidler 1985). The N-REAP model
gave policy-makers confidence in monetary contractions as a vehicle for disinflation, at
a time when some form of disinflation was urgently required. But it has not,
unambiguously, been predictively successful in the disinflationary period of its policyinfluence - at least if one does not resort to epicycle explanations, such as a simultaneous
increase in the Natural-Rate.iii
There are no truly general theories in science; only competing explanations which, for a
variety of reasons (not all to do with the 'classical' process) command varying degrees of
respect among practitioners. The N-REAP model challenged its primary adversary, the
trade off interpretation of the Phillips curve, and is now challenged by models which
invoke hysteresis, implicit contracts, insiders and outsiders, an expectations trap,
efficiency wages etc. Not all of these models deny that "at any point in time" (to use
Friedman's phrase) a Natural-Rate of unemployment might emerge from the Walrasian
equations; but they tend to deny that the gravitational pull of any particular Natural-Rate
is stronger that the gravitational pull of the actual rate of unemployment. The system is
perceived as being path-dependent: the natural-rate is a weak, not a strong, attractor
(Phelps 1996). For Alfred Marshall (1920, 564), "The most valuable of all capital is that
invested in human beings"; and unemployment above the Natural-Rate tends to reduce
the stock of human capital (thus increasing the Natural-Rate), leaving a large pool of
outsiders who have only a limited ability to affect the wages of insiders. Thus the idea
of a unique and stable equilibrium configuration exerting an all-powerful influence on
the actual course of unemployment has been challenged by the idea that the NaturalRate limps behind, and tracks, the actual rate, with (in Keynes' phrase) "not so lame a
foot".
One of the reasons for the success of the Monetarist challenge is Friedman's (1966a,
1966b, 1968a) prediction of (and an explanation for) stagflation (or positive comovements of Phillips curve observations). Friedman made the "prediction... There will
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be an inflationary recession" in his Newsweek column on 17 October 1966; and as even
his critics put it, "a prophet has only to be right once for his reputation to be secure
forever" (Desai 1981, 8); "Basically, accelerationism was a pessimistic forecast rather
than an explanation of experience; whatever else one thinks of the theory, the prophetic
accuracy of its pessimism has to be admired ... we are all accelerationists now" (Okun
1975, 354).
Yet, the judgement that both inflation and unemployment would simultaneously
increase was by no means a rare occurrence prior to the Keynesian discomfiture.
Gottfried Haberler (1961, 10), for example, noted that "we remain alert to the possibility
that inflation may be combined with depression (or recession) ... it is not at all unlikely
that inflation will either eventually bring about deflation and depression or make it
difficult to counteract a depression that has arisen independently. This is, in fact, one of
the main economic dangers (apart from the social injustice that it engenders) of even a
mild inflation". The editorial in the (highly influential) Journal of Commerce for 13
February 1957, declared that "creeping inflation will not lead to additional employment
but will ultimately cause a decline in employment". In a letter to the editor, published in
the same journal on 27 February 1957, Sumner Slichter, of Harvard University "undoubtedly the best known economist of his day to the American community
generally" (Dunlop 1961, xxi) - interpreted this editorial as implying "that the next
decade or so will see, first, rather slowly rising, then rapidly rising prices, and finally, a
big collapse and a severe depression". Saulnier (1963, 26) also predicted that inflation
would be followed by recession. Almost all economists were forecasting that inflation
was on the increase; many economists also calculated that unemployment would also
increase. Yet the trade-off interpretation of the Phillips curve appeared to imply that
increases in inflation would be accompanied by reductions in rates of unemployment.
For Keynes, the long period was a "subject for undergraduates" (Joan Robinson 1962,
75; Eshag 1963, 100, n118), and John Taylor (1979, 108), whilst accepting the vertical
long run Phillips curve, also noted that "it has proven distressingly unspecific as a
framework for the development of short-run dynamics". Friedman concluded, in his
famous methodological essay, that "The weakest and least satisfactory part of current
economic theory seems to me to be in the field of monetary dynamics, which is
concerned with the process of adaptation of the economy as a whole to changes in
conditions and so with short-period fluctuations in aggregate activity. In this field we do
not even have a theory that can be appropriately called 'the' existing theory of monetary
dynamics" (1953, 42; see also 1950, 467). Friedman later referred to the short-run
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Phillips curve as the missing equation in the monetarist model (Laidler 1981, 8). The NREAP model subsequently became 'the' theory of monetary dynamics, because it was
perceived to have predictively out-performed the (supposedly Keynesian) trade-off
misinterpretation of Phillips' curve.
Thus, Friedman is credited with an achievement that normally guarantees immortality in
the history of any science, that of using theory to predict what at the time was yet to be
observed. In the nineteenth century, John Couch Adams and Leverrier deduced from
general astronomical theory the existence and location of a hitherto unobserved planet.
The planet was located at the time and place that Adams and Leverrier had predicted
(Kline 1990, 243). Uranus and Neptune were unknown to Newton, but were deduced by
the application of his law of universal gravitation. Einstein became the most famous
scientist of all time when his prediction about the effect of gravity on the frequency of
light received empirical support from observations of a solar eclipse (Clark 1984, 295).
Likewise, Hubble's discovery that the universe is expanding had been independently
predicted from the general theory of relativity by Alexander Friedman in 1922, and A.G.
Lemaitre in 1927, several years before Hubble's discovery (Kilmister 1971, 37, 97-8).
By adding "one wrinkle" to Phillips in the same way as Irving Fisher added "only one
wrinkle to Wicksell", Friedman (1968a, 8) predicted that the trade-off between inflation
and unemployment always existed temporarily, but not permanently.
Robert Gordon (1978, xv) explained that he had found Milton Friedman's views
"outrageous" when he first joined the Chicago Money and Banking Workshop in 1968,
but found them "remarkably sensible" when he left in 1973. The first edition of
Gordon's Macroeconomics was organised entirely around the N-REAP model,
illustrating the extent to which even neo-Keynesians were retreating from previously
held perspectives. Temporary recessions - which persisted only as long as expectations
about inflation were inaccurate - would reduce inflation "to any desired amount, to zero
or even a negative number" (Gordon 1978, 305). The N-REAP model became
profoundly influential during the 1970s (Hargreaves Heap, 1980). In the 1960s, the
Phillips curve came to be interpreted as a proposition that "one can do business with the
[inflation] dragon - buying some reduction in the degree of inflation by feeding him a
certain number of jobs" (Lerner 1967, 3). At the AEA Conference, in the year following
Abba P. Lerner's Richard T. Ely Lecture, Friedman suggested that the inflation dragon
would not digest the unemployed, but merely detain them away from the workplace,
only as long as their delusions about inflationary expectations persisted. Unemployment
came to be viewed by many economists as a variable that could not be directly targeted:
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it was "a state of mind not a state statistic" (Cole et al. 1983, 93).
At the time of his AEA Presidential address, Friedman was regarded as a brilliant
phenomenon, but was also tainted with the failure of Barry Goldwater's 1964 US
Presidential election challenge (Tobin 1964). Many delegates to the 1967 AEA
Conference believed that both Friedman and his prediction of stagflation would be shot
down in flames (conversation with Ashenfelter, 2 October, 1993; see also Hall and
Taylor 1986, 115). Yet stagflation appeared to discredit Keynesian economists, and for
a decade from the mid-1970s policies derived from Friedman (at least rhetorically) were
implemented in a variety of countries. He was credited, even by his opponents, with the
introduction of inflationary expectations into the analysis of inflation and
unemployment, and of using this approach to uniquely predict stagflation (Mankiw
1990, 1647; Desai 1981, 1-9). Inflation was clearly rising in the 1960s (section 4.3); and
many others economists also calculated that unemployment was simultaneously
increasing (section 4.4). But it was Friedman whose reputation was incalculably
strengthened by this predictive success - which fitted in exactly with his method of
positive economics.
4.3 Prelude to the Natural-Rate: the Accelerating Inflation of the 1960s.
Arthur Okun (1972 [1969], 150) described the war in Vietnam as "the Danish Prince in
the Hamlet of our economic history". In the mid-1960s, the Johnson administration was
increasingly losing control of both the economy and the war in Vietnam. The Chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), Gardner Ackley, told a reporter from The
Wall Street Journal (19 October, 1966) that one could date the rapid rise in GNP to
President Johnson's press conference (June 28, 1965) announcing the dispatch of 50,000
American soldiers to Vietnam (Rosen 1969, 84-5). During 1965 economists within the
Johnson Administration became increasingly concerned that the twenty-five per cent
increase in military expenditure might overwhelm the Guideposts, and a special pricecost fighting apparatus was established (Cochrane 1975). On December 10, 1965, the
CEA urgently recommended a tax increase to finance the Vietnam war, although this
recommendation was not included in the January 1966 Economic Report of the
President, possibly because 1966 was an election year (Lekachman 1973, 19). This was
the year that the wage-price policy began to collapse (Cochrane 1975, 263). According
to Okun (1972 [1969], 154) this was "the first defeat of the new economics by the old
politics" since 1962. In late 1966 the CEA again argued for a tax increase, and in
January 1967 Johnson proposed an income tax surcharge, which was finally passed in
July 1968. This belated tax increase "ended the period of inappropriate budgetary
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stimulus, thirty-five months after it started, thirty months after it was first diagnosed by
the President's economic advisers, and eleven months after the President urgently
requested Congress to act. By [then] the boom and wage - price spiral had developed
enormous momentum and they proved terribly difficult to stop ... By the middle of 1968,
inflation had become a raging disease" (Okun 1972 [1969], 163; see also Cochrane,
1975, 263). Thus, even with inflation hovering around five per cent, some Keynesians
perceived that it was acquiring a dangerous momentum.
The 1970 CEA Annual Report, signed by Paul McCracken, Hendrick Houthakker and
Herbert Stein, declared that "The current inflation was generated by the mounting
budget deficits and rapid monetary expansion that began in 1965 with the escalation of
the Vietnam War and the massive increase in federal spending for domestic programs"
(cited by Okun 1972, 180; de Marchi 1975). The budget deficit for fiscal 1967 was $9.8
billion, and for 1968, $23 billion. The underestimate for defence outlays for fiscal 1967
was $10 billion (Tobin 1988, 132). Walter Heller (1969, 36) acknowledged that the
CEA and the Treasury were unaware of the Pentagon's expenditure plans for Vietnam,
which were consistently underestimated. "Covert operations" were also apparently
required to finance the war.
For Johnson, the price of honesty with respect to
expenditures in Vietnam would have been the demise of his Great Society program
(Lekachman 1973, 19). The war was clearly being financed in an inflationary manner,
and the second half of 1965 saw the beginning of a dangerous inflationary boom (Okun
1972 [1969], 153; Cagan 1979, 106).
The 1962 CEA Report (signed by Walter Heller, Kermit Gordon and James Tobin) had
concluded that any expansion of demand above a "full employment [figure of] 4.0 per
cent [could] be met by only minor increases in employment and output, and by major
increases [emphasis added] in prices and wages" (in Tobin and Weidenbaum 1988, 46).
Heller (1972 [1966], 145) warned that at full employment "the line between expansion
and inflation becomes thinner". Paul Samuelson (1953, 83) saw 4 per cent
unemployment as a "high employment ceiling". The unemployment rate in both 1966
and 1967 was 3.8 per cent; and 3.5 per cent in 1968. Samuelson and Solow's (1960,
192) original US Phillips curve became very steep at low levels of unemployment. The
same is true for Phillips' and Lipsey's original curves (Phillips 1958, 285; 1959, Fig 6;
Lipsey 1960, 4, 24). Regardless of whether or not a Phillips curve of any kind existed,
inflation in the US had been increasing every year since 1962, rising from 1.1 per cent in
that year to 4.0 per cent in 1968.
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The non-financial business sector increased eightfold its volume of commercial paper
issued between 1964-70. In 1967 and 1968 the average share price of a stock listed on
the New York Stock Exchange increased by 40 per cent, well in excess of the earnings
of listed companies (Burns 1972, 225-6). On July 21, 1967 Ralph Saul, President of the
American Stock Exchange wrote to all 573 members warning that "market conditions
indicate a serious level of speculative activity".iv Pratson (1978, 98) stated that a group
of money managers were warning of impending inflation in 1968.v
Fiscal
irresponsibility with respect to the Vietnam war (at least prior to the 1966 Congressional
elections), was compensated for by a credit crunch. Following the election, on
November 22, the Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve voted to 'uncrunch'
the liquidity crisis, and in 1967 and 1968 the money stock was expanded faster than at
any time since the Second World War (Cochrane 1975, 266).
The US had formal wage and price 'guideposts' between 1962-66. Solow (1966, 46)
argued that these guideposts had left wage inflation 1.7 per cent lower, and wholesale
price inflation 0.7 per cent lower than previous experience would have suggested.
Heller declared them to have exercised a moderating influence in the 1961-5 period
(1972, 149; Perry 1967, 897-904). The Committee for Economic Development
concurred,vi as did the Chairman of the CEA,vii and Time magazine.viii In the UK, the
Prices and Incomes Act was passed in August 1966. (A 6 month freeze was proclaimed
in October 1966, followed by 6 months of severe restraint.) However, the seamen's
strike of May 1966, and the dock strike of 1967, were signs of impending wage
inflation.ix Indeed, Sterling had been devalued from $2.80 to $2.40 in the month before
Friedman's Presidential address. The Nixon administration had a fully fledged control
program between August 1971 and April 1974. In November 1972 a statutory 90-day
freeze on pay, prices, rents and dividends was imposed, and this was later extended by a
further 60 days. Solow (1966, 54, 47) argued that high employment and rising
productivity "depend for their success upon the containment of the inflationary forces
which their pursuit may generate". The guideposts, he argued, had facilitated structural
change. The implication of Solow's analysis is that, in the absence of the guidelines, the
inflationary forces unleashed would undermine high employment and rising
productivity; in other words generate stagflation. Some Keynesians appeared to
recognise that inflation was likely to be followed by stagflation, especially if the
guideposts were abandoned.
Many economists were aware that inflation had acquired a powerful momentum and
was likely to become a major political issue. In Phillips curve space this implies, at
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worst, a vertical co-movement of inflation-unemployment observations. Friedman's
AEA Presidential Address implied a simultaneous increase in both inflation and
unemployment. But stagflation is equally well explained by forces other than the
gravitational pull of the Natural-Rate of unemployment (section 4.4).
4.4 Increasing Unemployment
Friedman (1968a, 9) argued that legally enforced minimum wage rates, the strength of
labour unions, plus the Walsh Healey and Davis-Bacon Acts had all combined to
increase unemployment. The authors of the trade-off interpretation of the Phillips curve
agreed. Solow (1966, 51) argued that the Davis-Bacon Act was an impediment to the
achievement of full employment and should be repealed. Samuelson (1967b, 56, 85, 64)
stated that the location of Phillips curve observations was determined by, and was a
problem for, anti-trust enforcement, labour legislation, excessively high minimum wage
laws, manpower retraining, and labour market mobility programs.
A low
unemployment rate may have been purchased at the cost of a higher future rate: the idea
that there exists a trade-off between unemployment today, and unemployment tomorrow
is "true in part. I think that this effect is plausible from economic reasoning. I think that
there is some experience in the statistics which suggests that this is in fact the case".
Friedman (1977, 458) also argued that measured unemployment had increased because
of the shifting structure of the labour force, reflecting an increase in the proportion of
females, young people and part-time workers.x This had been a general trend of the
post-war period. Between 1955-75 the proportion of the US labour force accounted for
by 16-24 year olds increased by over fifty per cent (Gordon 1978, 251). The birth rate
had increased substantially in the 1940s, and this led to a large increase in the number of
new entrants into the US labour force - requiring an additional 1.5 million jobs per
annum simply to avoid an increase in unemployment originating from these
demographic factors (Cooper and Johnston 1965). Even the 'aggregative'-dominated
1961 CEA concluded that approximately 22 per cent of the increase in measured
unemployment could be attributed to changes in the age-sex composition of the labour
force (Demsetz 1961, 90, n7). Cooper and Johnston (1965, 129, 130) calculated that by
1970 there would be a "dramatic" increase in the number of young workers. Part-time
work was perceived to be particularly prevalent amongst these cohorts, many of whom
would be seeking inexperienced entry level occupations. The increased job mobility of
these cohorts would tend to increase frictional and therefore aggregate measured
unemployment. Lekachman (1966, 162) concluded that these circumstances could
explain the very high levels of unemployment among the young. These high rates
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exerted an upward pressure on the aggregate unemployment rate. Both Lekachman and
Demsetz (1961) concluded that a micro approach to these structural problems was
needed, rather than the use of aggregative techniques.
There had also been a considerable amount of discussion about increasing levels of
structural unemployment in the US as a result of automation and technological advance.
The 'majority' position was that the bulk of unemployment could be attributed to
inadequate aggregate demand. The 'minority' position was that structural change would
generate increasing joblessness, even in the context of general prosperity. The primary
problem was not aggregate demand but structural barriers in the labour market.xi The
majority 'inadequate demand' position dominated the 1961 Joint Economic Committee
(Knowles-Kalacheck) Report. Heller (CEA chairman) denied the significance of
structural unemployment, and the 1961 CEA statement argued that the 'structuralist'
argument was false (Tobin and Weidenbaum 1988, 60): "'we' thought then, and Tobin
and I think now that the arguments of the 'structuralists' were part muddled and part
wrong ... the real question was not the existence of structural unemployment which no
one denied, but whether it had increased since 1955-6" (correspondence from Solow, 11
August, 1992).
Gilpatrick (1966, 12) argued that Heller's definition of inadequate demand appeared to
suggest inadequacies even at cyclical peaks, and his test for structural unemployment
was deemed to be inappropriate because he confined his examination to the 1957-60
period.xii Demsetz also conducted statistical tests of the hypothesis that the number of
hard-core unemployables was growing secularly and had come to account for a
significant proportion of the unemployed. For none of the groups that Demsetz
examined was this hypothesis rejected. He concluded that the hard-core unemployed
appeared to be growing in importance; he predicted that structural unemployment would
continue to become increasingly significant. The National Planning Association also
calculated that structural unemployment had relentlessly increased (Demsetz 1961, 81,
84, 87, 89, 90, 7).xiii
Gilpatrick (1966) argued that technological change had been rapid in the post-war
period; there had been a change in the composition of final demand away from goods
and towards services; distressed areas were identified as being caught in a vicious spiral.
The permanent loss of jobs led to an out-migration of younger workers who typically
had more transferable skills, thus reducing the attractiveness of these distressed areas to
new enterprises. The four mechanisms of labour market adjustment - participation rates,
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job mobility, geographic mobility and educational attainment - were found to be
inadequate to eliminate labour bottlenecks at both the top and the bottom of the skill
hierarchy. The post-1956 period showed increasing signs of structural skill shortages;
the pool of inappropriately trained youth had been growing dramatically; and the
percentage of black workers in low unemployment agriculture had severely declined.
Low educational attainment led to a vicious spiral of poverty and a rise in black
unemployment rates. Haber (1964, 11-14) calculated that sixty million workers in the
US were in jobs that would cease to exist within 25 years, and that most were
unprepared for this change.
Charles Killingsworth (1962) argued that over 9 per cent of those without an eighthgrade education were unemployed, whereas almost no college graduates were
unemployed. In consequence, boosting aggregate demand may lead increasingly to a
shortage of skilled labour, while leaving unskilled workers surplus to requirements
(Garraty 1978, 236-7). Structuralists argued that labour market imperfections required
specific remedies. Gunnar Myrdal identified a 'manpower drag' which could be solved
only by modernising the labour market (Schlesinger 1965, 497). Lekachman (1966,
162-3) concluded that structural unemployment was increasing alarmingly and that
middle management in particular was faced with obsolescence. Stanley Lebergott
(1964) noted that the long term unemployed (more than 15 weeks) had tripled since
1957 (Garraty 1978, 236-7, 244).
Friedman argued that the increased availability of unemployment assistance had tended
to increase measured unemployment. Much of the stigma attached to claiming
unemployment benefits had disappeared. Most economists would accept that
unemployment compensation has the unintended side-effect of providing firms with an
incentive to adjust to a temporary drop in demand by laying off workers. It also reduces
the incentive for laid-off workers to search, and increases the incentive to wait to be
recalled to their old job. In addition, it increases the incentive for the non-laid-off
unemployed to continue searching.xiv All of this tends to increase frictional
unemployment which, together with structural unemployment, comprised the 'full'
employment level of unemployment of the 1962 CEA Report.
Theobald (1968 [1964], 62) argued that official US unemployment figures were biased
downwards. If the statistics were to include discouraged workers, plus the 4 per cent of
the labour force who wanted full-time employment but could find only part-time
employment, plus the underemployed in the depressed agricultural, mining and
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industrial areas, then measured unemployment would be around 8 million instead of the
3.6 million in official statistics. The Secretary of Labor drew attention to the 350,000
males between 14 and 24 who have stopped looking for work (Theobald 1968 [1964],
62). The increased availability and generosity of unemployment assistance, tended to
increase the incentive to register for work and thus reduce the gap between measured
unemployment and the true variable for which it is acting as a proxy.
Friedman's AEA address came shortly after two important pieces of legislation (1965-6)
in the UK, the Redundancy Payments and National Insurance Acts. Both Acts had the
effect of increasing measured unemployment by subsidising job search. British
unemployment almost doubled between 1966-7. The unemployment-vacancies curve
shifted upwards from 1966; unemployment was higher for any given level of vacancies
(Gujarati 1972a). The net benefit earnings ratio for a family with two children rose from
an average of 40 to 70 per cent between 1960-7. The jump in 1966 is very prominent.
Unemployment was calculated to be 200,000 higher as a result. The proportion of the
labour force who had been unemployed for more than 26 weeks doubled between
October 1966 and October 1967 (Brittan 1975, 56, 65).
In addition to these supply side responses, these two Acts increased the quasi-fixed, or
overhead element of labour costs. The 3.0 per cent annual increase in GDP during 1967
and 1968 in the UK did not affect the unemployment rate, but the index of average of
weekly hours worked per worker increased, as did the percentage of those working
overtime. There appeared to have been a 'shake out' of previously hoarded labour
(Taylor 1972, 1360, 1354; see also Foster 1973; Gujarati 1972b, and 1973).
Many economists noted that the business cycle had changed quite significantly in the
post-war period, becoming shorter with average unemployment higher throughout.
Lekachman, for example, noticed that the 1949-53 expansion resulted in a 2.7 per cent
unemployment rate; the 1955-7 expansion culminating in a 4.2 per cent unemployment
rate; and the 1958-60 expansion resulted in an unemployment rate of 5.2 per cent.
Prophetically, Lekachman (1966, 189) suggested that the last recession (1958-60) had
been accompanied by significant price inflation, generating a "new paradox,
simultaneous recession and price inflation".xv
4.6 Concluding Remarks
The N-REAP counter-revolution was a genuine structural break in the history of
economic research (Buchanan 1987, 195-6; Lucas 1994, 221; Plosser 1994, 280). In his
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Nobel Lecture, Friedman explained the success of the monetarist intellectual and policy
revolution in terms of the classical process by which scientific theories are discarded:
"brute experience proved far more potent than the strongest of political or ideological
preferences ... The natural rate hypothesis is by now widely accepted by economists"
(1977, 470, 459; 1975a, 176). This 'classical' or 'idealist' internal assessment was
accompanied by some external pressure: "the resurgence of the quantity theory (renamed
non-descriptively as 'monetarism') and the rejection of simple Keynesianism have been a
reaction to the emergence of inflation and stagflation" (Friedman and Schwartz 1982,
70).
As a challenge to this widely-accepted view this chapter has reconstructed some of the
judgements made about the expected movements of inflation and unemployment in the
period prior to the unambiguous collapse of the original Phillips curve trade-off.
Inflation was commonly perceived as being on an upwards trajectory; many economists
(without necessarily invoking the analysis of inflationary expectations) also calculated
that unemployment would simultaneously increase. Much of the detailed analysis of
labour market conditions in the inflationary environment of the 1960s, calculated that
increases in inflation would be associated with increasing rates of unemployment,
although the Phillips curve trade-off was believed to be a hard empirical constant
(having lasted over 100 years). But these (mostly scattered) judgements were not
packaged in such a way as to convince the economics profession of the un-wisdom of
believing in the long run inverse trade-off. Only Friedman, it seems, was able to
accomplish that.
In so far as these intimations of stagflation were not scattered, they originated from the
structuralist analysis of unemployment. The equilibrating power of the Natural-Rate of
unemployment is not required to explain the stagflation which ended the Old Keynesian
era. Friedman was one of several economists who perceived that structural
unemployment had increased. Those who concluded that structural unemployment was
increasing along with the inflation of the 1960s had their scientific competence
questioned: "Talk of 'structural unemployment' was loose in the land - indeed, very loose
... Careful analysis of the statistical record within CEA convinced us that the structuralunemployment thesis was more fancy than fact ... Employment decisions in 1965-66
rendered a clear cut verdict on the structural-unemployment thesis: the alleged hard core
of unemployment lies not at 5 or 6 per cent, but even deeper than 4 per cent - how deep
still remains to be ascertained " (Heller 1966, 63-64); "Never did so many write so much
that is nonsense and inconclusive on this topic. The special American problems, that
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you [in Britain] seem not yet to have met, of whether there is a secular increase in
'structural unemployment', provided a marvellous example of what the new and brilliant
Council of Economic Advisers (Heller, Tobin, Gordon, Solow and others) could
contribute in their first months of office to this murky issue" (Samuelson 1962a, 22).
For Samuelson (1967b, 54-5), the inverse trade-off was "one of the most important
concepts of our time. Any criticism of the guideposts which does not explicitly take into
account the Phillips curve concept, I have to treat as having missed the fundamental
point of all economic discussions". Few, it seems (and this applies with particular force
to the textbook writers, almost all of whom were copying Samuelson's best-selling
formula) chose to be so treated in the 1960s.
The Chicago defenders of microeconomic orthodoxy believed that the advocates of
monopolistic competition had defined terms which "evades the issue, introducing
fuzziness and undefinable terms into the abstract model where they have no place, and
serves only to make the theory analytically meaningless" (Friedman 1953, 38). George
Stigler (1982d, 6) cautioned that no economist has "any professional knowledge on
which to base recommendations (concerning antitrust and monopolies) that should carry
weight with a skeptical legislator"; he also defined the short run as "at least a generation
or two" (1982a, 32). Friedman (1968a, 11) initially estimated that full adjustment back
to the Natural-Rate of unemployment would take "a couple of decades". Perhaps there
is something inherently optimistic at the heart of successful revolutions, but Friedman's
Natural-Rate (disinflation) prediction to the House of Commons Select Committee on
Monetary Policy was less accurate than his Natural-Rate (inflationary) prediction to the
AEA. Unlike the inflationary prediction that elevated the N-REAP model to centre
stage, the disinflation prediction described the lower half of the 'S' - that is it described
the reduction in unemployment that would (after a brief interval) follow from
disinflation policies. From "the best evidence", Friedman (1980, 61) predicted that "(a)
only a modest reduction in output and employment will be a side effect of reducing
inflation to single figures by 1982 and (b) the effect on investment and the potential for
future growth will be highly favourable". Unemployment was "an unfortunate side
effect of reducing inflation"; only rigidities stood in the way of a rapid return to the
natural rate of unemployment: "The mechanism causing the contraction in output is the
slowing of nominal spending in response to the slowing of monetary growth and the
inevitable lags in the absorption of slower spending by wages and prices". Policies
designed to produce "high employment had led to high unemployment", but subsequent
British unemployment experience was much worse than he predicted: "a temporary
retardation in economic growth" (Friedman 1980, 61, 56). Harry Johnson's (1971) AEA
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prediction appears in retrospect to be more accurate: "The most serious defects of the
Monetarist counter-revolution from the academic point of view are, on the one hand, the
abnegation of the restated quantity theory of money from the responsibility of providing
a theory of the determination of prices and output [analysing the supply response of the
economy to monetary impulses ... whether monetary changes affected prices or
quantities] and on the other hand, its continuing reliance on the methodology of positive
economics ... Personally, I expect [Monetarism] to peter out".
Stigler (1976a, 351) concluded that "economists exert a minor and scarcely detectable
influence on the societies in which they live"; but faith in the Quantity Theory of Money
gave President Reagan an unshakeable faith in the monetary method chosen to defeat
inflation, even in the face of alarmingly high unemployment figures (conversation with
Friedman, 7 August 1995). For Nigel Lawson (1992, 102), "the most important point is
that [the transitional cost in reducing inflation] is not a lasting cost". Stigler (1973c)
contributed to this confidence by finding that the volume of unemployment had no
statistically significant effect on voting behaviour, but the rate of inflation was
negatively related to the incumbent's share of votes. Stigler (1949b, 103) also ran
(possibly) the first Keynesian-Monetarist statistical race, finding for the latter a
correlation coefficient of 0.904, and for the former, 0.395.
It was on empirical grounds that Friedman had taken his stand (1968b, 439; 1970, 234;
1974b, 61; Friedman and Meiselman 1965, 761). Yet, as A.J. Brown has pointed out, in
the UK these positive co-movements were "very visible from about 1966. Friedman's
1967 lecture had a powerful impact because be made a neat theoretical point which
chimed in with what was being observed empirically" (correspondence from Brown, 1
June, 1993; see also Cole et al. 1983, 88; Ball and Burns 1977, 822). Some other
economists also formed the judgement that both inflation and rates of unemployment
would simultaneously increase, without invoking the idea of the gravitational pull of
equilibrium. But Friedman offered the profession a model, or at least a tight
macroeconomic narrative, with which to explain stagflation; the Phillips curve
Keynesians did not; neither did the labour market analysts discussed in this chapter.
Economists have a tendency to "float on the tide of theory" (Stigler 1957b, 9) and in
Alvin Hansen's words, "it takes a theory to kill a theory" (cited by Salant 1977, 46).
This explains, in part, the earlier success of the Keynesian revolution: The "classical
synthesis ... for the first time, was confronted with a competing system - a well-reasoned
body of thought containing among other things as many equations as unknowns. In
short, like itself, a synthesis; and one which could swallow the classical system as a
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special case. A new system, that is what requires emphasis. Classical economics could
withstand isolated criticism. Theories can always resist facts ... Inevitably, at the earliest
opportunity, the mind slips back into the old grooves of thought since analysis is utterly
impossible without a frame of reference, a way of thinking about things, or in short a
theory" [emphasis in text] (Samuelson 1964 [1946], 318).
Policy influence subsequently came to Friedman partly as a result of the perception
about predictive success discussed in this chapter. His influence can be attributed, in
part, to his commitment to the vocation that Roy Harrod detected in Keynes, "to
intervene actively in shaping public opinion" (cited by Parsons 1989, 52); in part, to his
"Ruthless Concentration" (Solow 1964a); and in part to the often unexamined dynamics
of economic knowledge construction and destruction.
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NOTES
i. Following the shock of the Tet offensive, Johnson concluded his March 31 television
address on the Vietnam War with an unprecedented announcement: "I shall not seek
and I will not accept the nomination of my party for another term as your President"
(cited by Alpert 1981, 97).
ii. Steven Resnick, in correspondence to the author, concluded that "What Friedman
and others accomplished was the transformation of their idea about reality into the
reality. That is an accomplishment worthy of economic priests ... an intellectual war
had to be waged against collective support for higher wages. Friedman became the
Luther of an individualism that helped to win the war. The struggle over Phillips' work is
but one important battle in that war".
iii. Ironically, Robert Solow's (1978b, 207) instincts were predictively more successful
in this context: "Nobody believes the deflationary half of the [Natural-Rate] proposition.
I don't know anybody who would lie out in the sun, let alone be burned at the stake, for
the belief that if the unemployment rate is U* [the Natural-Rate] plus epsilon and we
wait long enough, there would be accelerating deflation. That part nobody believes".
iv. Time Retrospective: Economics 1923-1989, 58.
v. Pratson does not disclose a source for this statement.
vi. They concluded that "the available evidence seems to suggest that the Guideposts
did make a notable though modest contribution to stability in 1962-65" (cited by Okun,
1972, 198).
vii. On August 12 1966, Gardner Ackley, Chairman of the CEA admitted that this period of
restraint had ended: the "guideposts had recently suffered some stunning defeats ...
this problem must be solved if we are to maintain full employment" (Time
Retrospective: Economics 1923-1989, 62).
viii. Time concluded on August 12 1966 that "more inflationary effects may be expected
to set in soon" (Time Retrospective: Economics 1923-1989, 58).
ix. Richard Crossman (1978, 208, 341) confided to his Diary that "we have just given
huge concessions to the doctors, the judges and the higher civil servants. It is an
ironical interpretation of a socialist incomes policy". Callaghan's 1967 Budget was a
reflection of "his new doctrine that we should abandon an artificial prices and incomes
policy and revert to a higher rate of unemployment".
x. Alternatively, a younger and more energetic labour supply might increase
productivity and therefore restrain inflation. I am grateful to A.J. Brown for this
suggestion.
xi. Miernyk (1966, vii) concluded that "By the end of 1965 it should have been evident to
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even the most casual observer that the demand stimulus [of the 1965 tax cuts] was not
enough and that further application of the same medicine could have at least mildly
inflationary consequences". (Unemployment had reached four per cent by December
1965.)
xii. Demsetz (1961, 84-5, n2) concluded that the CEA report contained a "serious logical
error ... the discriminating powers of the Council's test are practically nil ... the
Council's test ... leaves much to be desired".
xiii. In 1964 the US Secretary of Labor stated that "The confluence of surging population
and driving technology [is creating] a human slag-heap ... a separate nation of the poor,
the unskilled, the jobless" (cited by Theobald 1968 [1964], 64).
xiv. It may be anachronistic to refer to these activities by the term 'search', which
perhaps only entered the vocabulary of economists in the late 1960s.
xv. These points were also emphasised by the CEA's 1961 Statement and 1962 Report
(Tobin and Weidenbaum, 1988).

